Posture in one page
IntelliAI Group operates a static marketing surface, a serverless JSON API, a Supabase-backed data layer and a sovereign inference runtime. The security model is built on four separations:
- Presentation vs authority — pages never hold service-role keys; privileged operations live behind the API.
- Ambient vs explicit credentials — browser sessions are HttpOnly cookies; service clients use explicit bearer tokens.
- Money vs model — payment claims are idempotent and verified before fulfilment; inference cannot mutate billing state.
- Claim vs evidence — a control is listed here only if it is implemented or contractually available. Marketing copy does not create a security fact.
Browser security headers
The same policy is enforced in two places: vercel.json at the edge and serve.js for local/self-hosted runs. This closes the previous divergence where the local server blocked the Google Fonts that the edge allowed.
| Header | Value | Why |
|---|---|---|
Content-Security-Policy | default-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none' plus explicit script/style/font/img/connect/frame origins. | Blocks injected script origins, object embeds, base-tag hijacking and cross-origin form posts. |
Strict-Transport-Security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload | Pins HTTPS for one year and all subdomains. |
X-Content-Type-Options | nosniff | Stops MIME confusion on uploaded/downloaded content. |
X-Frame-Options | DENY (local) / SAMEORIGIN (edge, superseded by frame-ancestors 'none') | Prevents clickjacking. |
Referrer-Policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin | Sends only the origin cross-site. |
Permissions-Policy | camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=() | Removes device capabilities the site does not use. |
Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy | same-origin-allow-popups | Isolates the browsing context while allowing checkout popups. |
Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy | same-origin | Prevents cross-origin embedding of site resources. |
X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies | none | Blocks legacy cross-domain policy files. |
X-DNS-Prefetch-Control | off | Reduces speculative DNS leakage. |
Cache-Control (API) | private, no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0 | Prevents stale authenticated API responses at the CDN or browser. |
Known CSP limitation
The current pages ship inline <style> and <script> blocks, so style-src and script-src include 'unsafe-inline'. This is a deliberate migration state, not an end state. The roadmap is a nonce/hash pipeline that removes 'unsafe-inline' from script-src first, then style-src, with Trusted Types evaluated after that. Until then, the API remains JSON-only with default-src 'none' and the static surface keeps object/base/form/frame restrictions.
curl -sI https://www.intelliaigroup.co.za/ | grep -iE 'content-security|strict-transport|x-frame|referrer|permissions'. A missing header is a defect; report it through disclosure.Identity, sessions and access
| Control | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Password storage | bcrypt hashing; password length 12–128 with upper, lower, digit and special-character requirements. |
| Access token | access_token cookie, 15 minutes, HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict. |
| Refresh token | refresh_token cookie, 7 days, HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Strict; stored as a hash and rotated on refresh. |
| Session revocation | Logout deletes the session row and clears both cookies. Refresh re-checks the session row before issuing a token. |
| CSRF | Double-submit: csrf_token cookie plus X-CSRF-Token header, enforced for cookie-authenticated state changes. Bearer callers are exempt. |
| MFA | TOTP setup/verify/disable and a login challenge route. MFA state is stored per user. |
| Brute force | Login 5/min, registration 5/15 min, password reset 5/15 min, forgot-password 3/hour, general API 100/min. |
| Session binding | Sessions record an IP hash and user-agent hash; refresh validates the session row. |
| Service access | Supabase service-role keys exist only server-side. The browser receives no service-role credential. |
Payment security
- Card data is entered on Paystack's hosted checkout. IntelliAI Group does not store card numbers or CVV.
- Checkout amounts are recomputed server-side from the canonical plan/module map; a tampered client amount cannot under-price an order.
- Webhooks require
x-paystack-signature, verified as HMAC SHA-512 over the exact raw body with a constant-time comparison. - Payment references are claimed idempotently before fulfilment and released on failure, preventing double-fulfilment on retries.
- Live Paystack mode is disabled unless
PAYSTACK_MODE=liveandPAYSTACK_ALLOW_LIVEare both set. The default is test mode. - Invoice and receipt routes are authenticated and scoped to the current account.
Data protection and residency
| Topic | Position |
|---|---|
| Lawful basis | POPIA (Act 4 of 2013) obligations are mapped to contract, consent, legitimate interest and legal-obligation bases. The privacy notice and consent records are the operational source. |
| Data subjects | Access, correction and deletion requests are handled through the DSAR route and the privacy contact. Identity is verified before disclosure. |
| Encryption in transit | TLS 1.2+ at the edge and on API calls; HSTS pins HTTPS. |
| Encryption at rest | Provided by the managed database/storage layer. Key management is delegated to the platform; customer-managed keys are a contract option, not a default. |
| Residency | The production database region is fixed per deployment and recorded in the DPA. It is not asserted on this page because a region claim must match the contracted project, not the marketing copy. |
| Retention | Account, billing and audit records are retained for the period required by tax and company law; marketing consent records are retained until withdrawal plus the proof window. |
| Backups | Managed by Supabase according to the plan in force. Restore testing is a runbook step, not a public uptime claim. |
| Cross-border transfer | Where a subprocessor processes outside South Africa, the transfer is covered by the DPA and the subprocessor's safeguards. Confirm the current list before contracting. |
Infrastructure and isolation
- Edge/static: Vercel serves
public/with immutable asset caching and no-store API responses. - API: Express serverless function with Helmet, CORS allow-list, 16 KB JSON limit, Zod validation, rate limiting and a single error envelope.
- Data: Supabase (Postgres/Auth) with row-level access patterns and server-only service credentials.
- Inference: local Ollama/vLLM endpoint. A GPU outage degrades inference but does not take down identity or billing; health reports it separately.
- Least privilege: the static site has no database credential; the API has no card data; the inference runtime has no billing authority.
Vulnerability management
| Stage | Practice |
|---|---|
| Prevent | Schema validation at every write boundary; output encoding; CSP; dependency review; no secrets in the repository (vault references only). |
| Detect | Structured API logs with correlation ids; health probes; rate-limit and auth-failure signals; dependency advisory review. |
| Triage | Reports are acknowledged within 2 business days. Severity is assigned from exploitability and impact, not from the reporter's label. |
| Remediate | Critical: immediate containment, fix target 72 hours. High: 7 days. Medium: 30 days. Low: next scheduled release. Targets are internal policy; they are not a contractual SLA unless signed. |
| Verify | Fix is regression-tested, deployed, and the reporter is informed when disclosure is appropriate. |
Incident response
- Detect and classify — confirm the event, assign severity, open an incident record with a correlation id.
- Contain — revoke sessions/keys, isolate the affected component, preserve evidence.
- Eradicate — remove the cause, patch, and verify the control that failed.
- Recover — restore service, monitor for recurrence, validate data integrity.
- Notify — affected customers and the Information Regulator are notified without unreasonable delay where POPIA requires it. Notification content is reviewed by Legal/Compliance.
- Review — blameless post-incident review with owners, dates and a follow-up audit.
This is the operating model. It is not a promise of a fixed notification hour; the legal trigger and the facts determine the timeline.
Compliance and evidence
| Item | Status on this page | Evidence path |
|---|---|---|
| Company registration | CIPC 2026/429045/07 | Company documents on request |
| B-BBEE | Level 1 claim published by the company | Current certificate on request |
| SOC 2 Type II | Controls are operated; the report is not published on this page | Report under NDA via Trust Center |
| POPIA | Aligned controls and a privacy notice | Privacy notice, DPA, DSAR process |
| PCI DSS | Card data is handled by Paystack's hosted checkout; IntelliAI does not store card data | Paystack's attestation; scope statement on request |
| Accessibility | WCAG 2.2 AA target (see below) | Accessibility statement and audit |
Subprocessors
The production schedule is confirmed in the DPA. The categories below are the ones the architecture uses; a named provider is listed only where the integration is part of this build.
| Provider / category | Purpose | Data category |
|---|---|---|
| Vercel | Edge hosting, static delivery, serverless API | Request metadata, logs |
| Supabase | Postgres, authentication, storage | Account, billing and workload records |
| Paystack | Hosted checkout, payment processing, webhooks | Payment metadata; card data stays with Paystack |
| SMTP provider (deployment-configured) | Transactional email | Email address, message content |
| Google Fonts | Typeface delivery | IP/request metadata at font fetch |
| Crisp (if enabled) | Support chat | Chat transcript, contact details |
| Plausible (if enabled) | Privacy-preserving analytics | Aggregated page events |
DPA, SLA and contracting
A Data Processing Agreement and the current subprocessor schedule are available for review before contracting. Service levels, support hours, credits and termination assistance are defined in the signed order form or master agreement; they are not implied by this page.
Request the pack: info@intelliaigroup.co.za · Trust Center.
Accessibility statement
Target: WCAG 2.2 Level AA. Implemented: skip links, a single main landmark, visible focus, keyboard-operable navigation and palette, reduced-motion support, semantic tables and headings, colour contrast checked against the brand palette.
Known limitations: legacy pages still own their mobile navigation behaviour; some third-party iframes (checkout, support chat) are outside our DOM; PDF invoices may not be fully tagged. Report a barrier to info@intelliaigroup.co.za with the page and the assistive technology used.
Responsible disclosure
Report suspected vulnerabilities to info@intelliaigroup.co.za (subject: Security disclosure), or use the machine-readable contact at /.well-known/security.txt.
- Include the affected URL/route, reproduction steps, impact and any safe proof-of-concept.
- Do not access, modify or exfiltrate another party's data; do not run destructive tests or denial-of-service traffic.
- Give us a reasonable window to remediate before public disclosure. We will coordinate a disclosure date with you.
- We acknowledge within 2 business days and provide a status update after triage.
This policy does not authorise testing against third-party services (Paystack, Vercel, Supabase) outside their own programmes.